The last mechanism considered for the authors is centered in the theory of the Musical Expectation. They appeal to the theory proposal for Meyer (1956), informing that such mechanism is deeply dependent of the musical system and the familiarity that the listener has with this. The authors believe that such mechanisms had been developed throughout the evolution, leaving of the first one that they consider the mechanism that more acts for consequence not culturally controlable until the mechanism dependent of the musical structure (Musical Expectation). 3 fenomenolgicas Perspectives for the consideration of the body the study of Juslin and Vstfjll present great contributions with respect to considering the musically induced emotion in a different bias of the majority of the studies on musical emotion. As the proper authors affirm, the majority of the traditional studies considers only the representacionais characteristics of the musical structures that can induce emotion and they do not consider the emotion with a perceptual process or a cognitiva capacity. However, we believe that an modification in the form to consider such mechanisms to the light of the fenomenologia can be a considerable contribution for the studies in musical cognition. The fenomenologia such which proposal for Merleau-Ponty has presented descriptions on the perception that if it differentiates of the philosophy of cartesian dualista orientation, of psychology (especially to that one of supported on dualistas rules) and of traditional cognitiva science.
Such differentiation can be noticed in what the description of citizen and the object or to the description of the nature says respect. For Merleau-Ponty, the body acting in the world has basic paper for the replacement of such concepts. For it, the body is the proper expressive space and is for the experience of the body in the world that I reach the world. When discoursing on the perceived world it considers, it not as an objective, existing world independent of a percebedor, nor as a world constructed in me as representation of an objective world is of me, but as a lived world, for the percipient experience I disappear in the thickness of the world (Merleau-Ponty, 1999, P.